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FOR ACDA/ACTING DIR. GEORGE; SHAPE/FOR GEN. ROGERS AND
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PARM, START
 SUBJECT: (U) SOVIET PLENARY STATEMENT, MARCH 8, 1983

1. THIS IS START III-050. SECRET--ENTIRE TEXT.
2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SOVIET STATEMENT DELIVERED AT

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MARCH 8, 1983, PLENARY.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

- KARPOV STATEMENT, MARCH 8, 1983

MR. AMBASSADOR,

I

- ONE OF THE MAIN TASKS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS IS TO ENSURE THAT THE ACCORD WHICH THE DELEGATIONS ARE INSTRUCTED TO PREPARE RESULT IN ENHANCING STRATEGIC STABILITY AND THEREBY LESSENING THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR.

- TO CARRY OUT THIS TASK IT IS NECESSARY, FIRST, THAT THE FUTURE ACCORD ENSURE A LOWERING OF THE LEVEL OF NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION AND SERVE AS A RELIABLE BARRIER TO CONDUCTING THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE IN ANY CHANNELS AND, SECONDLY, THAT THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED BE IN STRICT ACCORD WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY AND EQUITABLY TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE SIDES.

- THE USSR DELEGATION'S STATEMENTS OF FEBRUARY 3, 15, 22 AND 24 AND MARCH 1, 1983, GRAPHICALLY SHOWED WHY THE USSR DELEGATION ASSESSES THE U.S. SIDE'S POSITION AS ACTUALLY AIMED NOT AT LIMITING AND REDUCING STRATEGIC ARMS, BUT AT CONTINUING A RACE IN THEM, INCLUDING ALONG NEW CHANNELS.

- IN ADDITION TO WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN SAID, AT TODAY'S MEETING WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO THE FOLLOWING.

- AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. POSITION, INCLUDING THE DOCUMENT TABLED BY THE U.S. DELEGATION CONCERNING THE "BASIC ELEMENTS" OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, SHOWS THAT IF THE U.S. PROPOSALS WERE IMPLEMENTED, THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE WOULD BY NO MEANS BE HALTED OR SLOWED DOWN. ON THE CONTRARY, IT WOULD BE ELEVATED TO A NEW LEVEL, TO A NEW DEGREE OF INTENSITY. THE FACTS AND THE SPECIFIC

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RESULTS TO WHICH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE U.S. PROPOSALS
WOULD LEAD TESTIFY TO THE VALIDITY OF SUCH A
CONCLUSION.

- LET US TAKE THE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE
SOVIET SIDE ADVANCES A PRECISE AND CLEAR SOLUTION ON
THIS SCORE--STAGE-BY-STAGE REDUCTION TO EQUAL LIMITS
IN THE NUMBER OF SUCH WEAPONS ON STRATEGIC DELIVERY
VEHICLES; THE SPECIFIC FIGURES FOR THESE LEVELS WOULD
BE SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SIDES, IN
CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER RELATED QUESTIONS.

- AND WHAT DOES THE U.S. SIDE PROPOSE? IT WOULD
APPEAR THAT IT IS TALKING ABOUT REDUCTIONS OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BUT, AS IT TURNS OUT, ONLY ON
BALLISTIC MISSILES. BUT UNDER THE U.S. APPROACH IT
TURNS OUT THAT THE TOTAL NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON
STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES CAN INCREASE, AND
SIGNIFICANTLY AT THAT, IN COMPARISON WITH THE NUMBER
OF SUCH WEAPONS CURRENTLY AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE U.S.
THE U.S. APPROACH ALSO PROVIDES FOR A MECHANISM FOR A
BUILD-UP IN THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON STRATEGIC
DELIVERY VEHICLES THROUGH DEPLOYMENT OF LONG-RANGE
CRUISE MISSILES. IF THE BLANKS IN THE RELEVANT SECTION
OF THE U.S. "BASIC ELEMENTS" WERE FILLED IN WITH
COEFFICIENTS USED IN THE SALT-2 TREATY, THE TOTAL
NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON ALL STRATEGIC DELIVERY
VEHICLES UNDER THE AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD REFLECT THE
U.S. APPROACH, WOULD AMOUNT TO NO LESS THAN THIRTEEN
THOUSAND, IF NOT SIXTEEN THOUSAND. BUT, AFTER ALL, TO
MAKE THE PICTURE COMPLETE, ONE WOULD NEED TO ADD THE
NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON LAND- AND SEA-BASED LONG-RANGE

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CRUISE MISSILES, FOR WHICH THE U.S. SIDE PROPOSES NO
LIMITATIONS AT ALL. THIS CAN BE CHARACTERIZED AS
NOTHING OTHER THAN AN ARMS RACE.

- SUCH AN ORIENTATION OF THE U.S. POSITION CAN ALSO
RESULT IN A TOTAL NUMBER OF STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES
SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER THAN THE OVERALL LEVEL OF SUCH
VEHICLES, DEDUCIBLE AT THE FORMAL LEVEL FROM THE U.S.
POSITION.

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- THE U.S. SIDE'S POSITION AS CURRENTLY FORMULATED NOT ONLY FAILS TO HALT THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE, BUT IS ALSO DIRECTLY CONTRARY TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF EQUALITY AND OF ENSURING EQUAL SECURITY OF THE SIDES. WHILE OUTWARDLY PROCLAIMING AS ITS GOAL THE ESTABLISHMENT OF EQUALITY "IN ALL RESPECTS," IN REALITY THE U.S. APPROACH IS AIMED AT DESTROYING THE ESTABLISHED BALANCE IN STRATEGIC ARMS TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE U.S., AND AT PROVIDING OBVIOUS MILITARY ADVANTAGES FOR THE U.S. SIDE. THE U.S. SIDE'S DESIRE TO MAKE LAND-BASED ICBMS SUBJECT TO PRIMARY AND DEEPEST REDUCTIONS HAS A SIMPLE RATIONALE: TO DAMAGE THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE POTENTIAL OF THE USSR AND TO FORCE THE SOVIET SIDE TO ENGAGE IN A RADICAL RESTRUCTURING OF ITS STRATEGIC FORCES ACCORDING TO "PRESCRIPTIONS" ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE U.S. SIDE. AFTER ALL, IF ONE CONSIDERS THAT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF EXISTING OVERALL PARITY THE SOVIET SIDE'S ICBMS, IN TERMS OF WARHEADS, COMPRISE APPROXIMATELY 70 PERCENT OF ITS STRATEGIC DEFENSE POTENTIAL, WHILE U.S. ICBMS COMPRISE APPROXIMATELY 20 PERCENT OF ITS TOTAL NUMBER OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IT BECOMES MORE THAN OBVIOUS THAT THE U.S. PROPOSALS ON PRIORITY REDUCTIONS IN ICBMS ARE ONE-SIDED AND ORIENTED TOWARDS U.S. ADVANTAGE.

- AS A RESULT OF IMPLEMENTING THE U.S. PROPOSALS, THE U.S. WOULD OBTAIN NEARLY A TWOFOLD ADVANTAGE IN THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS ON ICBMS AND SLBMS, AND AN EVEN GREATER ADVANTAGE IN THE TOTAL NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON ALL STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES, UNLESS THE SOVIET UNION ENGAGES IN AN ARMS RACE.

- MR. AMBASSADOR, TO SUM UP, THE SOVIET SIDE ONCE AGAIN WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE ITS CONVICTION THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC ARMS WILL ACCOMPLISH ITS TASKS AND CONTRIBUTE TO THE ENHANCEMENT OF STRATEGIC STABILITY ONLY IF THE OBLIGATIONS TO BE ASSUMED BY THE USSR AND THE U.S. EFFECTIVELY BLOCK THE CHANNELS FOR AN ARMS RACE, ENSURE SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN THE STRATEGIC POTENTIALS OF THE SIDES AND MAINTENANCE OF PARITY BETWEEN THE SIDES, I.E., IF THESE OBLIGATIONS ARE IN

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ACCORD WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY.
- THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION AT THE NEGOTIATIONS IS BASED ON PRECISELY SUCH AN APPROACH EMBODIED IN THE BASIC PROVISIONS TABLED BY US FOR THEIR INCLUSION IN THE AGREEMENT UNDER PREPARATION.

II

- MR. AMBASSADOR, WE ARE CONVINCED THAT CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES MUST BECOME ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF THE TREATY BEING PREPARED ON THE LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC ARMS, AN ELEMENT AIMED AT ENSURING STRATEGIC STABILITY.
- IN THE COURSE OF PREVIOUS ROUNDS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THE SOVIET SIDE REPEATEDLY ADDRESSED THIS QUESTION.

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- FOR PURPOSES OF CONSTRUCTIVE PROGRESS AT THE NEGOTIATIONS, AT TODAY'S MEETING THE USSR DELEGATION TABLES THE FOLLOWING DRAFT ARTICLE ON THE QUESTION OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, FOR INCLUSION IN THE ACCORD BEING PREPARED ON THE LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC ARMS:

ARTICLE XVIII

- "FOR PURPOSES OF STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE AND PRECLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF MISINTERPRETATION OF ACTIONS OF THE OTHER PARTY, EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES:

(A) NOT TO CARRY OUT FLIGHTS OF HEAVY BOMBERS IN AGREED ZONES FROM WHICH IT IS POSSIBLE TO REACH THE CONTINENTAL PART OF THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER PARTY WITH AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES;

(B) NOT TO OPERATE AIRCRAFT CARRIERS IN AGREED ZONES FROM WHICH CARRIER-BASED NUCLEAR DELIVERY AIRCRAFT CAN REACH THE CONTINENTAL PART OF THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER PARTY;

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(C) NOT TO CARRY OUT ANY ANTI-SUBMARINE ACTIVITY, INCLUDING OPERATION OF DETECTION SYSTEMS, IN AGREED

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ZONES ESTABLISHED FOR THE MOVEMENT OF MISSILE-CARRYING SUBMARINES OF THE OTHER PARTY;

- (D) TO NOTIFY THE OTHER PARTY WELL IN ADVANCE OF A MASS TAKE-OFF OF ITS HEAVY BOMBERS;

- (E) TO NOTIFY THE OTHER PARTY WELL IN ADVANCE OF A MASS TAKE-OFF OF ITS FORWARD-BASED AIRPLANES;

- (F) BEFORE CONDUCTING EACH PLANNED ICBM LAUNCH, TO NOTIFY THE OTHER PARTY WELL IN ADVANCE ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS THAT SUCH A LAUNCH WILL OCCUR, EXCEPT FOR SINGLE ICBM LAUNCHES FROM TEST RANGES OR FROM ICBM LAUNCHER DEPLOYMENT AREAS, WHICH ARE NOT PLANNED TO EXTEND BEYOND ITS NATIONAL TERRITORY."

- IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE PROPOSALS--ALONG WITH THE REDUCTIONS WHICH WE PROPOSE IN THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES AND THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THEM, AS WELL AS OTHER MEASURES ON LIMITING AND REDUCING STRATEGIC ARMS--WOULD BE OF EXCEPTIONALLY GREAT SIGNIFICANCE FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF ENHANCING STRATEGIC STABILITY AND PRECLUDING SITUATIONS FRAUGHT WITH THE DANGER OF A NUCLEAR CONFLICT.

- FOR EXAMPLE, THE BAN ON MOVEMENT OF AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AND FLIGHTS OF HEAVY BOMBERS IN ZONES FROM WHICH NUCLEAR CARRIER AIRCRAFT, AS WELL AS AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES, CAN REACH THE CONTINENTAL PORTION OF THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE, WOULD BE AN EFFECTIVE STEP TOWARD PRECLUDING THOSE ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD BE USED FOR HEIGHTENING DANGEROUS TENSION OR FOR DELIVERING A SURPRISE NUCLEAR STRIKE. AS FOR THE DIMENSIONS AND BOUNDARIES OF THE RELEVANT ZONES, THEY WOULD BE AGREED UPON IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

- OF SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE WOULD BE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SSBN SANCTUARIES, IN WHICH ANY ANTI-SUBMARINE ACTIVITY OF THE OTHER SIDE, INCLUDING THE USE OF DETECTION DEVICES, WOULD BE BANNED. THIS WOULD RESULT IN GREATER SURVIVABILITY OF SUBMARINES, WHICH IN TURN WOULD SERVE AS AN ADDITIONAL GUARANTEE THAT IN ANY EVENT THE INITIATOR OF A NUCLEAR ATTACK COULD NOT

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COUNT ON IMPUNITY. AND THIS IS PRECISELY ONE OF THE PREREQUISITES OF STABILITY. THUS, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUCH ZONES WOULD SERVE AS ONE OF THE IMPORTANT MEANS TO PRECLUDE CRISIS SITUATIONS WHICH COULD GROW INTO NUCLEAR CONFLICT.

- THE SOVIET PROPOSALS ON NOTIFICATIONS OF A MASS TAKE-OFF OF HEAVY BOMBERS AND FORWARD-BASED AIRPLANES, AS WELL AS RELEVANT ICBM LAUNCHES, ARE ALSO DICTATED BY INTERESTS OF STRENGTHENING MUTUAL CONFIDENCE, ESPECIALLY IN PRECLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF MISINTERPRETATION OF ACTIONS OF THE OTHER SIDE.

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III

- IN THE COURSE OF THE CURRENT ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS, AT THE FEBRUARY 8, 1983, MEETING THE U.S. DELEGATION ADDRESSED THE QUESTION OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. AS WE SEE FROM WHAT THE U.S. DELEGATION HAS SAID, THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE U.S. APPROACH IN THIS AREA HAVE BEEN REITERATED BY YOU AT THE MEETING TODAY.

- HOWEVER, IF ONE COMPARES THE PROPOSALS OF THE SIDES IN THIS AREA, ONE CANNOT BUT ADMIT THAT THE SOVIET APPROACH IS OF A FAR BROADER AND MORE EFFECTIVE NATURE. WE PROPOSE MEASURES WHICH WOULD MEAN NOT THE SIMPLE REGISTRATION OF FACTS, BUT RATHER ADDITIONAL SERIOUS LIMITATIONS IN THE INTERESTS OF ENHANCING CONFIDENCE AND STRENGTHENING STABILITY. THIS, FOR EXAMPLE, REFERS TO THE OBLIGATIONS RECORDED IN SUBPARAGRAPHS "A" AND "B" OF THE ARTICLE WE TABLED ON BANNING MOVEMENT OF AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AND FLIGHTS OF HEAVY BOMBERS IN CERTAIN ZONES.

- THE SOVIET PROPOSALS ON NOTIFICATIONS OF A MASS TAKE-OFF OF HEAVY BOMBERS AND FORWARD-BASED AIRCRAFT-- SUBPARAGRAPHS "D" AND "E" OF ARTICLE XVIII--RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF RELEVANT NOTIFICATION IN A MORE UNIVERSAL WAY, AND NOT JUST IN CONNECTION WITH SOME MANEUVERS OR OTHERS, AS THE U.S. SIDE PROPOSES.

- MOREOVER, IT IS TOTALLY INCOMPREHENSIBLE WHY THE U.S. PROPOSALS COMPLETELY IGNORE SO VERY IMPORTANT AN ISSUE AS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SSBN SANCTUARIES, IN

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WHICH ANTI-SUBMARINE ACTIVITY OF THE OTHER SIDE WOULD BE BANNED. AFTER ALL, THE USEFULNESS OF SUCH A MEASURE FOR ENHANCING STRATEGIC STABILITY, AND IN ANY SITUATION

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AT THAT, IS OBVIOUS. THE SOVIET SIDE HAS CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED THIS.

- NOR IS THERE ANY NEED FOR A FORMAL EXPANSION--AS FOLLOWS FROM THE U.S. PROPOSAL--OF THE LIST OF THE KINDS OF BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHES SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION, THROUGH THE INCLUSION OF LAUNCHES WHICH CANNOT BE A CAUSE FOR THE SIDES' REAL CONCERN. NOTIFICATIONS OF SUCH LAUNCHES WOULD ADD NOTHING TO REACHING THE GOAL OF STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE AND ENHANCING STRATEGIC STABILITY; DRAFT ARTICLE XVIII OF THE TREATY, TABLED BY US TODAY, PROVIDES FOR EXTENSIVE AND EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO REACH THAT GOAL. THE SOVIET SIDE IS ADDRESSING PRECISELY THOSE LAUNCHES WHICH COULD CAUSE CONCERN FOR THE OTHER SIDE, BEARING IN MIND THE U.S. SIDE'S WISHES EXPRESSED DURING PREPARATION OF THE SALT-2 TREATY. AT THE SAME TIME, OUR PROPOSAL TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THAT MISSILE LAUNCHES BEYOND NATIONAL TERRITORY ARE ALREADY REGULATED BY THE 1971 SOVIET-U.S. AGREEMENT ON MEASURES TO REDUCE THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR AND THE 1972 AGREEMENT ON THE PREVENTION OF INCIDENTS ON AND OVER THE HIGH SEAS. AND, MR. AMBASSADOR, AS I COULD NOTE FROM YOUR STATEMENT TODAY, YOU PROCEED FROM THE PREMISE THAT THESE AGREEMENTS WILL REMAIN IN FORCE.

IV

- MR. AMBASSADOR, TAKING THE ABOVE INTO ACCOUNT, THE USSR DELEGATION PROPOSES THAT WE WORK ON REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE TEXT OF ARTICLE XVIII CONCERNING CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES ALONG WITH THE OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT TREATY. END TEXT ROWNY

END OF MESSAGE

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